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Abstract 
We develop a novel financial market model in which the stock markets of two countries 
are linked via and with the foreign exchange market. To be precise, there are domestic 
and foreign speculators in each of the two stock markets which rely either on linear 
technical or linear fundamental trading strategies to determine their orders. Since 
foreign stock market speculators require foreign currency to conduct their trades, all 
three markets are connected. Our setup entails a natural nonlinearity which may cause 
persistent endogenous price dynamics. Moreover, we analytically show that market 
interactions can destabilize the model’s fundamental steady state. 
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  11 Introduction 
Recurrent dramatic upward and downward movements of international asset prices raise 
the question whether our global financial system is inherently unstable. Consider, for 
instance, the course of major stock markets since the mid 1990s. First we saw the 
emergence of the dot-com bubble and its consequent crash. Afterwards, many stock 
markets around the world recovered, reaching even previous highs, but only to collapse 
once again in the second half of 2007. How spectacular such long-term price swings can 
be is visible in the top panel of Figure 1, which displays the evolution of the German 
stock market index, the so-called DAX, between 1996 and 2010. The DAX more than 
tripled its value twice, and yet it lost about half of its value twice, too. A similar 
worrying picture emerges with respect to foreign exchange markets. The strong shifting 
behavior of the USD-EUR exchange rate, depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1, is 
only one of many stunning examples. After a shaper downward movement between 
1999 and 2002, the USD-EUR exchange rate almost doubled its value by 2008, only 
then to lose a substantial part of its value again. Comprehensive historical accounts of 
such phenomena and their macroeconomic consequences are provided by Kindelberger 
(1978), Minsky (1982), Galbraith (1997), Shiller (2003) and Akerlof and Shiller (2008). 
----- Figure 1 about here ----- 
Without doubt, a crucial question is thus what kind of mechanisms may cause 
such dynamics. While no monocausal explanation is to be expected here, our paper 
points out that integrated international financial markets may be prone to severe price 
fluctuations. To be precise, we show that stock and foreign exchange markets are – by 
construction – nonlinearly interwoven and that interactions between them may give rise 
to endogenous dynamics. Our results are based on a model which has the following 
  2structure. We consider two countries, called countries H(ome) and A(broad). Both 
countries have a stock market in which the market participants (speculators) use either 
technical or fundamental analysis rules to predict the future direction of the markets. 
Hence, there are four types of traders in each stock market: domestic chartists, domestic 
fundamentalists, foreign chartists and foreign fundamentalists. In order to highlight the 
nonlinear connection between the markets, we design the model as simply as possible. 
In particular, the relative importance of the four trader types is constant over time and 
their trading strategies are linear. Moreover, the price adjustments in the stock and 
foreign exchange markets are proportional to the traders’ excess demands. 
It is important to note that the stock markets are linked via and with the foreign 
exchange market. First, technical traders who trade abroad take both the stock price 
trend and the exchange rate trend into account. Second, fundamental traders who trade 
abroad condition their orders on both mispricing on the foreign stock market and 
mispricing on the foreign exchange market. Third, the transactions of foreign traders go 
through the foreign exchange market. Suppose, for instance, that a trader from country 
A wants to buy stocks in country H. Then this trader obviously also trades on the foreign 
exchange market to obtain foreign currency for the stock purchase. The amount of 
foreign currency required is a nonlinear function: the demand for stocks, which is a 
function of current and/or past stock prices, is multiplied by the current stock price. This 
nonlinearity, which has a quite natural foundation, is the only nonlinearity within our 
model. But, as we will see, its impact on the dynamics is not to be underestimated. 
  Simulations of our model – a six-dimensional nonlinear dynamic system – reveal 
that interactions between stock and foreign exchange markets may trigger endogenous 
dynamics. That is, the stock prices of the two countries and the associated exchange rate 
  3oscillate continuously around their fundamental values for a broad range of parameter 
values. Moreover, we also establish the destabilizing nature of market interactions 
analytically in the form of a (local) stability analysis. Irrespective of whether there are 
interactions between the markets, our model has a unique steady state in which prices 
properly reflect their fundamental values. Roughly speaking, we find that if the steady 
state of the model with isolated stock markets is unstable, then the steady state of the 
model with market interactions is also unstable. However, if the steady state of the 
model with isolated stock markets is stable, the steady state of the model with market 
interactions may be unstable. In this sense, market interactions can be regarded as a 
destabilizing force for the dynamics of international financial markets. Our results also 
indicate that regulating financial markets is a complicated issue since causalities acting 
inside our model may run against basic economic intuition. 
Our paper is part of the burgeoning field of agent-based financial market 
modeling (for recent surveys see Chiarella et al. 2009, Hommes and Wagener 2009, Lux 
2009 and Westerhoff 2009, among others). Guided by empirical evidence
1, a number of 
interesting approaches have been proposed in the last 20 years which help us to explain 
the behavior of financial markets. Let us briefly categorize the main mechanisms 
discussed so far.  
-  In Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992), Chiarella et al. (2002) and Farmer and 
Joshi (2002), endogenous dynamics arise since the trading behavior of destabilizing 
technical and/or stabilizing fundamental traders is nonlinear. For instance, technical 
                                                                                          
1 Empirical evidence showing that financial market participants rely on technical and fundamental trading 
rules to determine their orders is overwhelming, see Hommes et al. (2005), Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), 
Menkhoff et al. (2009), Heemeijer et al. (2009), among others. These results strengthen the view that 
agents are boundedly rational (Simon 1982, Kahneman et al. 1986, Smith 1991).
 
  4traders may be more aggressive than fundamental traders when prices are close to the 
fundamental value and their orders can thus initiate a bubble. However, fundamental 
traders may become more aggressive as the bubble continues to grow and trigger 
some kind of mean reversion.  
-  In other models, e.g. by Kirman (1991), Lux (1995) and Brock and Hommes (1998), 
speculators switch between technical and fundamental analysis (e.g. due to herding 
dynamics, market conditions or the rules past performance). A market may thus be 
unstable if speculators prefer technical trading but turns stable if they switch to 
fundamental analysis.  
-  Finally, Westerhoff (2004), Chiarella et al. (2005), Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) and 
Chiarella et al. (2007) consider multi-asset market dynamics. For instance, in these 
models a market may be stable as long as fundamental traders are in the majority. 
However, if there is a temporary inflow of technical traders (who may previously 
have traded elsewhere) the market may temporarily become unstable.  
To sum up, while most models proposed so far consider that agents use nonlinear 
trading rules, switch between competing trading strategies and/or markets, our paper 
additionally points out that stock and foreign exchange markets are – by construction – 
nonlinearly interwoven and that this can give rise to instability and the onset of 
endogenous dynamics.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a novel 
model in which the dynamics of two stock markets and one foreign exchange market are 
linked. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our analytical and numerical results, respectively. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. A number of proofs are given in the Appendix. 
 
  52 The model 
In this section, we develop a model with interdependent stock and foreign exchange 
markets. For simplicity, we concentrate on a two-country setup and label the two 
countries H(ome) and A(broad). Both countries have their own currency. In each of the 
two stock markets there are four types of traders: chartists from countries H and A and 
fundamentalists from countries H and A. In general, chartists bet on a continuation of 
price trends while fundamentalists try to exploit mispricings. We assume that all traders 
rely on linear trading rules and that their market impact is constant over time. No 
speculators focus explicitly on the foreign exchange market.
2 However, stock market 
traders from abroad require foreign currency to conduct their trade. Moreover, their 
stock market orders depend on the expected future course of the exchange rate and thus 
the two stock markets are linked via and with the foreign exchange market. The model 
is closed by postulating positive relations between price changes and excess demands in 
all three markets.  
We proceed as follows. In Sections 2.1 to 2.3, we characterize the stock market 
in country H, the stock market in country A and the foreign exchange market, 
respectively. In Section 2.4, we summarize the structure of our model. As we will see, 
its dynamics is driven by three coupled second-order difference equations. 
 
2.1 The stock market in country H 
We start by modeling the stock market in country H. Let   be the log stock price of  H
t P
                                                                                          
2 Dieci and Westerhoff (2010) add nonlinear foreign exchange speculation to a simplified version of our 
framework. They find that foreign exchange speculators who switch between technical and fundamental 
trading rules may generate intricate bubbles and crashes in the foreign exchange market which then 
spillover to stock markets, from which they feed back towards the foreign exchange market, and so on. 
Such a framework is also studied in Tramontana et al. (2009).
 
  6this market at time step t. Since log stock prices adjust proportionally to excess 
demand, we can write 
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where   is a positive price adjustment parameter and  ,  ,   and 
 are the orders of domestic chartists, domestic fundamentalists, foreign chartists 
and foreign fundamentalists, respectively.
H α H H
t C D ,
,
H H
t F D ,
,
A H
t C D ,
,
A H
t F D ,
,
3 Consequently, excess buying drives the 
price up and excess selling drives it do
Chartists try to identify trading signals by extrapolating past price trends into the 
future. Orders of chartists from country H investing in market H are given by 
) ( 1
, ,
,
H
t
H
t
H H H H
t C P P D − − = β ,                                           (2) 
where  is a positive reaction coefficient. Note that (2) implies that domestic 
chartists base their orders on the most recently observed price trend. For instance, if 
they observe an increase in the price, they optimistically submit buying orders. 
H H, β
Fundamentalists seek to profit from mean reversion. Orders of fundamentalists 
from country H active in market H are written as 
) ( , ,
,
H
t
H H H H H
t F P F D − = γ ,                                          (3) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter and  H H, γ H F is the log fundamental value of 
stock market H. Hence, if stock market H is undervalued (overvalued), domestic 
fundamentalists perceive a buying (selling) opportunity. 
Chartists from country A investing in the stock market of country H take into 
                                                                                          
3 The amount demanded by each group of speculators is proportional to a quantity or trading signal which 
may be interpreted as the expected log-return from investing in the stock market (see, e.g. Dieci and 
Westerhoff 2010). 
  7account both the most recent stock market trend in country H and the most recent 
exchange rate trend. Therefore, 
) ( 1 1
, ,
,
H
t t
H
t t
A H A H
t C P S P S D − − − − + = β ,                             (4) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter and   is the log exchange rate, defined as 
the log price of one unit of country H’s currency in terms of country A’s currency. 
Suppose that the stock price and the exchange rate increase. Then this type of trader will 
take a buying position. If one or both trends weaken, the order size decreases. However, 
even a weak downward trend in one of the markets accompanied by a strong upward 
trend in the other market still generates buying orders. 
A H, β t S
We express the orders of fundamentalists from country A investing in stock 
market H as follows 
) ( , ,
, t
S H
t
H A H A H
t F S F P F D − + − = γ ,                                         (5) 
where   is a positive reaction coefficient and   is the log fundamental exchange 
rate. Obviously, this type of trader takes mispricing in stock market H and mispricing in 
the foreign exchange market into account and seeks to profit from them both.
A H, γ
S F
4 
 
2.2 The stock market in country A 
Since the stock market in country A is essentially a mirror image of the stock market in 
country H, we obtain a similar set of equations for the stock market in country A. 
Accordingly, the log stock price in country A at time step t+1 is quoted as 
                                                                                          
4 Since  , where lowercase letters denote absolute prices, an 
alternative interpretation for trading rule (5) would be that foreign fundamentalists condition their orders 
on the mispricing of stock H in terms of country A’s currency. A similar argument holds, of course, for 
trading rule (4). 
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where   is a positive price adjustment parameter and  ,  ,   and   
are the orders of its four types of market participants.  
A α A A
t C D ,
,
A A
t F D ,
,
H A
t C D ,
,
H A
t F D ,
,
Orders of chartists from country A trading in stock market A total 
) ( 1
, ,
,
A
t
A
t
A A A A
t C P P D − − = β ,                                                                                           (7) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter. Orders of fundamentalists from country A 
active in stock market A amount to 
A A, β
) ( , ,
,
A
t
A A A A A
t F P F D − = γ ,                            (8) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter and  A A, γ A F  indicates the log fundamental 
value of stock market A. 
Chartists from country H speculating in stock market A seek to trade 
) ( 1 1
, ,
,
A
t t
A
t t
H A H A
t C P S P S D − − − + + − = β ,                   (9) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter. Finally, fundamentalists from country H 
active in stock market A place orders 
H A, β
) ( , ,
, t
S A
t
A H A H A
t F S F P F D + − − = γ ,                              (10) 
where   is a positive reaction coefficient. Note that foreign traders take in (9) and 
(10) the inverse exchange rate into account and that the log of the reciprocal value of the 
exchange rate is 
H A, γ
t t S S Exp Log − = ]] [ / 1 [ . Similarly,  S F −  is the log of the inverse 
fundamental exchange rate. 
 
2.3 The foreign exchange market 
Changes in the log exchange rate are also proportional to excess demand. Here, excess 
  9demand is solely due to the orders of stock traders who speculate abroad. Recall that the 
log exchange rate is defined as the log price of one unit of country H’s currency in 
terms of country A’s currency. We thus obtain 
⎟
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⎝
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P Exp
D D P Exp S S α ,                      (11) 
where   is a positive price adjustment parameter. The mechanics behind (11) are 
central to our paper and deserve commenting upon. 
S α
Note first that all stock orders are given in real units. As a result, the currency 
demand of traders from country A investing in country H is the product of their (real) 
stock transactions times the current stock prices, i.e.  . Suppose 
that country A traders are buying stocks in country H so that this expression is positive. 
Their (positive) demand for foreign currency then increases the exchange rate. A similar 
argument holds for traders from country H investing abroad. However, here we have to 
take the reciprocal value of the exchange rate into account. Moreover, if these traders 
buy country A’s stocks, they sell their own currency to obtain foreign currency, which 
explains the minus sign in front of the term  .  
) ]( [ ,
,
,
,
A H
t F
A H
t C
H
t D D P Exp +
) ])( [ / ] [ ( ,
,
,
,
H A
t F
H A
t C t
A
t D D S Exp P Exp +
As should furthermore be clear, the nonlinearity in (11) is quite natural and not a 
simple ad-hoc addition to our model. It arises from price-quantity interactions and the 
existence of foreign stock market traders. Yet, its consequences for the model dynamics 
are quite significant. As we will see, such nonlinear interactions constitute a new 
possible explanation for the instability of international financial markets and the onset 
of endogenous upward and downward movements of stock prices and exchange rates. 
Of course, we rely on specific functional forms for the currency demand components in 
(11), based on the view that demand functions (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) represent stock 
  10orders in physical units. In a number of related heterogeneous agent models, different 
specifications have been adopted.
5 Such alternative specifications could easily be 
handled within our setup by taking the more general view that demand reaction 
coefficients γ s and β s are not fixed but state-dependent, again obtaining a nonlinear 
dynamical system. It can be proven that such generalizations have no impact on the 
analytical stability properties of the ‘fundamental steady state’, derived in the next 
sections. The proof is sketched in Appendix 4.  
 
2.4 Summary 
Straightforward calculations reveal that the dynamics of our model is due to a set of 
three coupled second-order difference equations 
) , , , ( 1 1 1 − − + = t t
H
t
H
t
H H
t S S P P G P ,                        (12) 
) , , , ( 1 1 1 − − + = t t
A
t
A
t
A A
t S S P P G P ,                 (13) 
) , , , , , ( 1 1 1 1 − − − + = t t
A
t
A
t
H
t
H
t
S
t S S P P P P G S .                 (14) 
While the first two equations are linear, the third is (highly) nonlinear. In the following, 
we investigate model (12)-(14) using a combination of analytical and numerical 
methods. 
 
3 Analytical results 
We now present several analytical results which indicate that interacting international 
financial markets are more likely to be unstable than isolated national financial markets. 
                                                                                          
5 For instance, in Chiarella et al. (2002, 2005) demand functions formally similar to (2)-(5) and (7)-(10), 
derived within a one-period mean-variance setup, represent the amount of wealth to be invested in the 
stock market. In this case, demand in real units would be obtained through adjustments for the price (and 
exchange rate) levels.  
  11Our analytical investigation rests on the simplifying assumption that the stock markets 
of countries H and A are symmetric. However, in Section 4 we numerically illustrate 
that qualitatively similar results can also be expected in situations in which the stock 
markets are asymmetric. In Section 3.1, we first discuss some general characteristics of 
our model. We then compare the stability properties of isolated and interacting stock 
markets, taking two different approaches. In Section 3.2, we hold the number of 
speculators constant when markets open up, i.e. we consider a mere relocation of the 
existing mass of speculators. In Section 3.3, we allow market integration to lead to an 
inflow of additional foreign speculators. Section 3.4 provides insight into stock market 
dynamics in a regime with fixed exchange rates, as compared to a regime with flexible 
exchange rates. 
 
3.1 Some preliminary insights 
By introducing three auxiliary variables, model (12)-(14) can be rewritten as  
) , , , ( 1 t t
H
t
H
t
H H
t Z S U P G P = + ,                                                                                          (15) 
,                                                                         (16) 
,                                                                                          (17) 
H
t
H
t P U = +1
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A
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A
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A
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A
t P U = +1 ,                                                                 ( 1 8 )  
,                                                            (19) 
,                                                                                                                (20) 
where 
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A
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A
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H
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S
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− + + + − +
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) ( ) (
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,   (22) 
,     (23) 
i.e. the evolution of the two stock prices and the exchange rate is driven by a six-
dimensional nonlinear dynamical system. 
)] ( ) ( ) )[( exp(
)] ( ) ( ) )[( exp(
) , , , , , (
S A AH AH AH AH A AH A AH AH A S
S H HA HA HA HA H HA H HA HA H S
A A H H S
F F Z S U P S P
F F Z S U P P S
Z S U P U P G
− + + − + − − − −
+ + − − + − − + =
=
γ β β γ β γ β α
γ β γ β β γ β α
        
        
  Obviously, one steady state of the model is given with  
) , , , , , ( : S S A A H H F F F F F F = F .                    (24) 
We call this steady state the fundamental steady state since stock prices and the 
exchange rate reflect their fundamental values. As a result, there is no further trade and 
prices are at rest. The proof of the uniqueness of this steady state is provided in 
Appendix 1.  
For simplicity, yet without loss of generality, we assume for the price adjustment 
coefficients  . The Jacobian matrix of our model, evaluated at its 
steady state, can then be expressed as 
1 = = = S A H α α α
= : ) (F J        ( 2 5 )  
, 
where   and  . Note that the Jacobian matrix for 
generic (strictly positive) reaction coefficients can be reduced to the above matrix via 
suitable changes of parameters, as shown in Appendix 2. 
⎟
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β β β γ γ β β β γ β γ β
β β γ β β γ γ β β
β γ β β β γ γ β β
) exp( : H H F = Φ ) exp( : S A A F F − = Φ
The analytical study of the (local asymptotic) stability conditions of the 
fundamental steady state does not appear possible in general. However, some analytical 
  13results can be extracted in the case of symmetric markets, that is, under the following 
relationships between the parameters 
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪ ⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
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= =
= =
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= =
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γ γ γ
γ γ γ
β β β
β β β
                   (26) 
where superscripts D and F now identify the demand parameters of speculators trading 
in their (D)omestic market and in the (F)oreign market, respectively.  
In this case, the Jacobian matrix (25) turns into 
= : ) (F J        ( 2 7 )  
   
and tedious computations (reported in Appendix 3) allow us to factorize the 6th degree 
characteristic polynomial 
⎟
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) (λ P  of the Jacobian matrix (27) as  
), ( ) ( ) ( 4 2 λ λ λ P P P =                       (28) 
where  ) ( 4 λ P  is a 4th degree polynomial and  ) ( 2 λ P  is a 2nd degree polynomial. The 
latter expression reads 
). ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2
2
F D F D F D P β β λ γ γ β β λ λ + + − − + + − =                        (29) 
As we will see, this factorization enables us to perform, in the reference case of 
symmetric markets, a rather exhaustive comparison of the stability conditions for the 
system of interacting markets with the stability conditions we obtain when stock 
markets are independent.  
  14Let us therefore consider next the case in which speculators are not allowed to 
trade abroad (i.e.  ). The dynamics of the two stock markets of countries H 
and A are then given by two uncoupled two-dimensional linear dynamical systems. To 
be precise, the stock prices in the two countries evolve according to 
0 = = F F γ β
i D i
t
D i
t
D D i
t F U P P γ β γ β + − − + = + ) 1 ( 1 ,                                    (30)  
i
t
i
t P U = +1 ,                                    (31) 
with  , having unique fundamental fixed points  } , { A H i∈ i i i F U P = = . The 
characteristic polynomial associated with (either of) the two isolated symmetric stock 
markets is given by 
D D D Q β λ γ β λ λ + − + − = ) 1 ( ) ( 2 ,                            (32) 
and necessary and sufficient conditions for the (global asymptotic) stability of the 
fundamental steady state can be written as 
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
<
+ <
1
) 1 ( 2
D
D D
β
β γ
.                    (33) 
Assume now that speculators are free to choose whether to trade on their own 
stock market or on the foreign stock market. We distinguish between the case where 
interactions arise via a simple relocation of the existing mass of investors (who are 
already active in their domestic markets) and the case where there is an inflow of 
additional foreign speculators. To simplify matters and to avoid additional notation, we 
assume that parameters  ,  ,   and   are proportional to the number of 
speculators in each group. 
D β F β D γ F γ
 
3.2 Relocation of speculators 
We now compare the case of interacting markets (with characteristic polynomial (28)-
  15(29)) with the case of isolated markets (with characteristic polynomial (32)) by 
assuming that the sum of   and   and the sum of   and   are constant, i.e. we 
set   and  , where 
D β F β D γ F γ
F D β β β − = F D γ γ γ − = β  and γ  are fixed quantities, proportional to 
the total number of chartists and fundamentalists, respectively, from either country. Of 
course, the case of isolated markets corresponds to   and 
. In the case of a mere relocation of speculators, therefore polynomial 
β β β = ⇒ = D F 0
γ γ γ = ⇒ = D F 0
) ( 2 λ P  becomes independent of  ,  and identical to polynomial
F β F γ ) (λ Q , i.e. 
β λ γ β λ λ λ + − + − = = ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2
2 Q P  ,                                                         (34) 
so that in equation (28) only factor  ) ( 4 λ P  is affected by the relocation (via parameters 
 and  ). It follows that if all of the six characteristic roots of 
F β F γ ) ( ) ( ) ( 4 2 λ λ λ P P P =  
have modulus smaller than one (i.e. the fundamental steady state of the system of 
interacting markets is locally asymptotically stable), then, a fortiori, the roots of  ) (λ Q  
are also smaller than one in modulus, and therefore the isolated stock markets are stable. 
Put differently, isolated unstable markets cannot be stabilized through market 
integration and a relocation of speculators, because stability of the integrated system 
requires the stability of the isolated markets.  
The converse implication is not true: if  ) (λ Q  has “stable” roots, i.e. parameters 
β  and γ  satisfy the conditions 
⎩
⎨
⎧
<
+ <
1
) 1 ( 2
β
β γ
,                                                                                                               (35) 
the integrated system may become unstable whenever parameters   and   are such 
that 
F β
F γ
) ( 4 λ P  has at least one “unstable” root (i.e. of modulus larger than unity). An 
example of this is provided in Section 4 (see discussion of Figure 3). 
  16To sum up, we have thus proven the destabilizing impact of market integration, 
whenever this is obtained through a mere relocation of existing speculators. 
 
3.3 Market entry of additional foreign speculators 
Consider now the case in which parameters   and  , respectively   and  , are 
not constrained to each other, which means that integration occurs via the entry of 
additional foreign speculators. The analysis of this case is slightly more complicated 
than the case of a mere relocation of speculators, yet the destabilizing effect of market 
interactions can again be proven, at least for a broad region of the parameter space. We 
obtain our results by discussing the analytical conditions (on parameters  ,  ,   
and  ), under which polynomial 
D β F β D γ F γ
D β F β D γ
F γ ) ( 2 λ P  in equation (28) has unstable roots, in 
connection with the stability conditions (on parameters   and  ) derived from 
polynomial 
D β
D γ
) (λ Q  in equation (32). In particular, this allows us to identify a ‘minimal’ 
region within the parameter space in which otherwise stable, isolated markets are 
destabilized by speculators who trade abroad. 
First of all, it follows from (29) that the conditions 
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
− <
− + + <
F D
F F D D
β β
γ β β γ
1
  2 2 2
                      (36) 
are necessary and sufficient for both roots of  ) ( 2 λ P  to be smaller than one in modulus. 
A sufficient condition for the steady state of the integrated system to be unstable is 
therefore that some root of  ) ( 2 λ P  is larger than one in modulus, i.e. at least one of the 
following inequalities holds 
F F D D γ β β γ   2 2 2 − + + >                    (37) 
  17or 
F D β β − >1 .  
                      (38)
 
By considering these inequalities jointly with the stability conditions (33), it can 
be concluded that markets that are stable in case of isolation may generate an unstable 
integrated system in two different ways, both of which we illustrate in Figure 2. Here 
the area of the parameter space ( ) bounded by the axes and the thick lines 
represents the stability region S for the case of isolated markets. Now, depending on 
parameters   and  , a region  , indicated in yellow, can be identified for 
which the isolated stock markets are stable but the integrated system is not. 
D D γ β ,
F β
F γ S R ⊂
----- Figure 2 about here ----- 
The two possible destabilization mechanisms are as follows. First, once markets 
become connected (due to additional speculators trading abroad), a loss of stability 
occurs if 
) 1 ( 1 < < −
D F β β ,                                          (39) 
i.e. if foreign chartists are strong enough (indicated in both panels of Figure 2).  
Second, even if  , it may still be the case that parameter   is so 
large that we have
 
) 1 ( 1 < − <
F D β β F γ
) 2 2 ( 2 2 2
D D F F D β γ γ β β + < < − + +   . 
                                   (40) 
Then the system is destabilized due to strong reactions of foreign fundamentalists, as 
depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 2. Note that this mechanism cannot occur in a 
situation in which  , as is the case in the left-hand panel of Figure 2.  0 2 ≥ − F F γ β
Two points deserve greater discussion. The first point concerns the region of 
instability (in parameter space) for the system of integrated markets. Consider the white 
  18region   included in region S of stability of the isolated markets. In Case A (i.e. 
, left-hand panel of Figure 2) this region is defined as 
R S \
0 2 ≥ − F F γ β
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
− <
+ <
F D
D D
β β
β γ
1
2 2
 ,
                                                          (41) 
whereas in Case B (i.e.  , right-hand panel of Figure 2) it is specified as  0 2 < − F F γ β
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
− <
− + + <
F D
F F D D
β β
γ β β γ
1
2 2 2
.
                                                       (42) 
We remark that in this parameter region, complementary to region R, the integrated 
system is not necessarily stable. In other words, the yellow area R represents only a 
minimal region of instability for the integrated system, because it is determined without 
taking into account the possible additional parameter combinations for which the roots 
of  ) ( 4 λ P  are larger than one in modulus.  
The second issue concerns the possibility that integration may stabilize 
otherwise unstable stock markets. This possibility depends on the starting situation. 
- If   but  , then the isolated markets are unstable due to the behavior 
of trend extrapolators, and can by no means be stabilized by integration. The reason is 
that   implies  , i.e. the integrated system is unstable, too, as is also 
clear from Figure 2. 
D D β γ 2 2 + < 1 > D β
1 > D β F D β β − >1
- If    but  , then isolated stock markets are unstable due to the 
overreaction of domestic fundamentalists. However, condition (36) indicates that if the 
foreign chartist parameter   is sufficiently large (but such that  ), and the 
foreign fundamentalist parameter   is not too large, then the two roots of 
1 < D β D D β γ 2 2 + >
F β F D β β − <1
F γ ) ( 2 λ P  may 
become smaller than unity in modulus (see the blue area in the left-hand panel of Figure 
  192). In this case, and if the roots of  ) ( 4 λ P  are also smaller than one in modulus, unstable 
isolated markets become stabilized through market interactions. We present a numerical 
example for such an outcome in Section 4.2. 
It is clear from the above discussion that market integration also tends to be 
destabilizing in the case of an entry of additional foreign speculators. In fact, the 
possibility that interactions stabilize otherwise unstable isolated markets is restricted to 
the particular (and rather unrealistic) case in which stock markets are unstable due to 
strong reactions by (domestic) fundamentalists. 
Our analytical results can be summarized and interpreted as follows. There are 
two main mechanisms that cause the integrated system to display ‘more instability’ than 
the isolated stock markets. The first direct mechanism is associated with the existence 
of a larger amount of trading in each stock market, due to the inflow of traders from the 
other country. This mechanism, related to (the coefficients and the roots of) polynomial 
) ( 2 λ P , determines the ‘minimal’ instability region in Figure 2, that is to say, it provides 
a first broad set of conditions under which interactions destabilize otherwise stable 
stock markets. Essentially, if the system is displaced from its steady state path due to 
exogenous shocks affecting only stock price H (say at time 0 and time 1), then the 
immediate evolution of price H (at time 2) is directly obtained by a second-order linear 
difference equation whose characteristic polynomial is  ) ( 2 λ P . Comparing with the case 
of isolated markets (with characteristic polynomial  ) (λ Q ), it is clear that the only 
difference comes from the increased strength of technical and fundamental trading 
(  and   vs.   and  , respectively), by which the original parameter 
combination ( ) may now find itself within the yellow instability area in Figure 2. 
Of course, this first mechanism is ‘inactive’ in the case of simple relocation of 
F D β β +
F D γ γ +
D β
D γ
D D γ β ,
  20speculators, as proven in Section 3.2. 
The second indirect mechanism operates through the exchange rate adjustments 
generated by the change in demand for stock. Assume, for instance, that the above 
described exogenous shocks to price H generate, ceteris paribus, a positive excess 
demand for stock H (starting from the situation of zero excess demand at the steady 
state). The excess demand for stock H, besides increasing price H, brings about also an 
upward adjustment of the exchange rate. As a consequence, next period demand for 
stock H, and also for stock A, from foreign traders will be affected by observed (and 
predicted) exchange rate movements, too, producing, in general, larger stock price 
adjustments than in the case of independent markets. In our model, such indirect 
mechanism is governed by the fourth-degree polynomial  ) ( 4 λ P . Its impact on the 
dynamics may be quite complicated, and sometimes counterintuitive, as suggested by 
the numerical experiments reported in Section 4. 
 
3.4 Flexible versus fixed exchange rates  
The analytical results presented above have largely been possible by the factorization of 
the characteristic polynomial  ) (λ P  of the full model with integrated (symmetric) 
markets, and by the study of the roots of factor  ) ( 2 λ P . A further straightforward 
economic interpretation of the second-degree polynomial  ) ( 2 λ P  is yielded from the 
following thought experiment, concerning the comparison of a free floating exchange 
rate regime with a system of fixed exchange rates. Intuitively, if equation (11) of the 
model is replaced by a fixed (log) exchange rate  t F S S S
t ∀ = =   , , equal to its 
fundamental value, the trading behavior of foreign chartists and foreign fundamentalists 
becomes equal to the trading behavior of domestic chartists and domestic 
  21fundamentalists (there is neither a trend nor a mispricing in exchange rates and thus 
these trading signals vanish). As a result, the markets essentially decouple and evolve as 
two independent two-dimensional linear dynamical systems. In the case of symmetric 
markets, and using the notation introduced above, the characteristic polynomial 
associated with each of the two independent systems would become exactly equal to 
) ( 2 λ P . The analysis carried out in this section can then also be interpreted in the sense 
that a change to a free floating exchange rate regime may destabilize otherwise stable 
stock markets. 
 
4 Numerical results 
Now we numerically illustrate some of our analytical findings. We also extend our 
analysis in the sense that we show that nonlinear interactions between stock and foreign 
exchange markets may give rise to endogenous dynamics for a broad range of parameter 
combinations. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we explore the cases where there is a simple 
relocation of speculators and where there is an inflow of additional foreign speculators, 
respectively. In Section 4.3, we turn our attention to asymmetric markets. 
 
4.1 Relocation of speculators 
In Section 3.2, we have shown that if there is a mere relocation of speculators, unstable 
isolated stock markets cannot be stabilized through market interactions, yet stable 
isolated stock markets may become destabilized through market interactions. To 
introduce an example for the latter finding, let us first assume the parameter setting  
  22⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪ ⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
= = =
= = =
= = =
= = =
, 00 . 0
, 65 . 0
, 00 . 0
, 60 . 0
, ,
, ,
, ,
, ,
H A A H F
A A H H D
H A A H F
A A H H D
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
β β β
β β β
                                                  (43) 
i.e. speculators do not trade abroad. As can easily be verified, the steady states of both 
isolated stock markets are then stable, implying that after an exogenous shock, stock 
prices return to their fundamental values. 
  However, consider now that both stock markets open up and that speculators 
relocate on the markets as follows 
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪ ⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
= = =
= = =
= = =
= = =
. 50 . 0
, 15 . 0
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γ γ γ
γ γ γ
β β β
β β β
                                                                      (44) 
Note that (44) implies that  ,  ,   
and  . Hence, we can interpret (44) in the sense that some speculators 
who were previously restricted to their home markets now speculate – with the same 
aggressiveness – abroad.
6 . 0
, , = +
H A H H β β 6 . 0
, , = +
A H A A β β 65 . 0
, , = +
H A H H γ γ
65 . 0
, , = +
A H A A γ γ
6 Moreover, let us fix (for all simulations)  .   0 = = = S A H F F F
Figure 3 shows a snapshot of the resulting dynamics. The panels show from top 
to bottom what is happening in stock market H, stock market A and the foreign 
exchange market, respectively. The left-hand panels depict the dynamics in the time 
domain (after a longer transient period) while the right-hand panels show the dynamics 
                                                                                          
6 Recently, several papers successfully estimated small-scale agent-based financial market models (Gilli 
and Winkler 2003, Alfarano et al. 2005, Boswijk et al. 2007, Manzan and Westerhoff 2007, Franke and 
Westerhoff 2010). While studies based on daily data find positive yet small values for the reaction 
parameters of chartists and fundamentalists, estimates based on monthly or annual data report much larger 
values. These estimates are not directly comparable to our setup but nevertheless indicate that our values 
for the reaction parameters are not unreasonable, at least for a monthly, quarterly or annual perspective.
 
  23in phase space. As we can see, all three markets are characterized by quasi-periodic 
motion. Apparently, nonlinear market interactions, as specified in our model, can 
generate enduring oscillations of international asset prices.
7 
----- Figure 3 about here ----- 
This is an important insight, and it is interesting to explore for which parameter 
combinations the model produces endogenous fluctuations. For this reason, we present 
four bifurcation diagrams in Figure 4. In each diagram we use parameter setting (44) but 
vary the reaction parameter indicated on the axis. Of course, in this case we assume a 
relocation of a fixed number of speculators and, therefore, when, e.g. parameter   is 
increased, parameter   is automatically decreased. The dynamics are plotted 
for the log stock price in country H.  
F β
F D β β β − =
What are the results? The top right panel reveals that an increase in the 
aggressiveness of foreign chartists is destabilizing. If this parameter is low, we observe 
that stock price H converges towards its fixed point (the same is true for the other two 
markets). However, if this parameter exceeds a critical value, endogenous dynamics 
kick in. Surprisingly, a similar picture is obtained for the reaction parameter of home 
fundamentalists (bottom left). If this trader type is too aggressive, a system of 
interdependent markets becomes unstable. Symmetrically, the top left panel shows that 
more aggressive domestic chartists tend to stabilize the markets. Finally, also more 
aggressive foreign fundamentalists are apparently conducive to market efficiency 
(bottom right). To summarize, when agents relocate across the two stock markets, an 
                                                                                          
7 Should policy makers now introduce a fixed exchange rate regime such that the exchange rate is equal to 
its fundamental value, the trading behavior of foreign fundamentalists and foreign chartists becomes 
identical to the trading behavior of domestic fundamentalists and domestic chartists, respectively. As a 
result, the dynamics becomes stable and stock prices converge towards their fundamental values. 
  24increase in the impact of foreign chartists (and a simultaneous symmetric decrease in 
the impact of domestic chartists) is destabilizing, whereas the opposite effect is 
observed under an increase in the impact of foreign fundamentalists (and a simultaneous 
decrease in the impact of domestic fundamentalists). 
----- Figure 4 about here ----- 
All in all, it may thus be concluded that the emergence of endogenous dynamics 
in a system of interrelated financial markets is quite robust, at least in the vicinity of our 
leading parameter setting.
 Moreover, the dynamic properties of our model sometimes go 
against standard intuition. Here we see, for instance, that more aggressive home 
fundamentalists destabilize the markets.
8 Regulatory policies which aim at stabilizing 
financial markets by promoting fundamental analysis in domestic markets may thus 
backfire. Regulatory policies have to be carefully designed in a system of interacting 
international financial markets. 
 
4.2 Market entry of additional foreign speculators 
It is clear from section 3.3 that the market entry of additional foreign speculators tends 
to be destabilizing, and numerical examples of such a scenario can easily be found. For 
instance, instability results if  and parameters   and   are selected from 
the yellow region in the right-hand panel of Figure 2.  
  2
F F β γ >
D β
D γ
However, let us now turn to the possibility that unstable isolated stock markets 
may become stabilized through speculative activity from abroad. Assume the parameter 
setting 
                                                                                          
8 The destabilization effects observed in this example are solely due to the subset of eigenvalues related to 
polynomial factor ) ( 4 λ P  in equation (28), being polynomial  ) ( 2 λ P  unaffected by the relocation (see 
equation 34). 
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According to the respective stability conditions, both isolated stock markets are 
unstable, i.e. after an initial shock, stock prices and exchange rates explode. Clearly, the 
loss of stability is caused by too aggressive fundamentalists. 
  However, consider now that financial market integration leads to an inflow of 
additional foreign speculators so that we have the parameter setting 
⎪
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                                                                                (46) 
Figure 5 presents the resulting dynamics (the design is as in Figure 3). Again, we 
observe endogenous dynamics in the stock and foreign exchange markets.
9 In this 
sense, if financial market integration leads to an inflow of additional foreign 
speculators, a system of interacting financial markets may be more stable than isolated 
financial markets. 
                                                                                         
----- Figure 5 about here ----- 
The four bifurcation diagrams of Figure 6 depict the dynamics close to this 
 
9 A parameter setting for which the fundamental steady states of the two isolated stock markets are 
unstable while the fundamental steady state of the complete model is stable is obtained if in (46)   is 
reduced from 0.53 to 0.52, as can be seen in the top right bifurcation diagram of Figure 6. 
F β
  26parameter setting (the design is as in Figure 4).
10 All in all, we observe a similar 
dynamic behavior if the parameters remain close to this setting. Moreover, the results 
presented in some panels again violate basic economic intuition. Consistent with basic 
economic intuition, we observe that more aggressive foreign chartists are destabilizing 
while more aggressive foreign fundamentalists are stabilizing. Contrary to basic 
economic intuition, we observe the opposite for domestic chartists and domestic 
fundamentalists. If domestic chartists become more aggressive, price fluctuations are 
less wild. If domestic fundamentalists become more aggressive, the amplitude of price 
fluctuations increases. Once again, we note that it may be difficult to regulate financial 
markets. Crowding out home chartists would not be a good idea if parameter setting 
(46) is approximately correct.  
----- Figure 6 about here ----- 
 
4.3 Asymmetric markets 
We finally turn our attention to asymmetric markets and provide numerical evidence 
which reveals that our results may also be valid if markets are not symmetric. 
Moreover, we demonstrate that our model may even produce complex price 
dynam
Let us compare the parameter setting 
                                                                                         
ics.
11  
 
10 The local bifurcations of the steady state visible in the first, second and fourth panel of Figure 6 depend 
solely on the behavior of the roots of factor  ) ( 4 λ P   of the characteristic polynomial (28), since the 
parameter ranges of these diagrams are completely within the region (36) in which the roots of  ) ( 2 λ P  are 
smaller than one in modulus. 
11 However, complex dynamics can also be observed in symmetric markets.  
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with the parameter setting 
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which imply asymmetric isolated and asymmetric interacting markets, respectively. For 
parameter setting (47), the dynamics of both isolated stock markets are stable. If 
markets open up and if speculators merely relocate across markets, (47) may turn into 
(48).  
Figure 7 shows the dynamics of our model for parameter setting (48). It is clear 
from the time series plots that the fundamental steady state is unstable and that both 
stock prices and the exchange rate evolve in quite an irregular manner. The complexity 
of the dynamics is further illustrated by the emergence of strange attractors, as depicted 
in the right-hand panels of Figure 7. Hence, also in the presence of asymmetries, stable 
isolated stock markets may become destabilized through market interactions. 
----- Figure 7 about here ----- 
If we consider an inflow of additional foreign speculators, also unstable isolated 
asymmetric stock markets may become stabilized through market interactions. Here is 
one example in which we compare the parameter setting 
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against the parameter setting 
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Under parameter setting (49), both asymmetric isolated stock markets are unstable, 
caused by a strong aggressiveness of (domestic) fundamentalists.  
However, if there is an additional inflow of foreign speculators such that we 
obtain parameter setting (50), irregular price dynamics set in. According to the left 
panels of Figure 8, interactions prevent price explosions. Instead, stock prices circle in a 
complex fashion around their fundamental steady states, which again brings about 
strange attractors (see right-hand panels).
12 
----- Figure 8 about here ----- 
 
5 Conclusions 
Actual financial markets regularly display severe bubbles and crashes. To understand 
these challenging phenomena we explore a novel financial market model in which the 
stock markets of two countries are nonlinearly connected via and with the foreign 
exchange market. For simplicity, speculators use either linear technical or linear 
fundamental trading rules to determine their orders. If at least some speculators trade 
                                                                                          
12 A scenario in which an inflow of additional foreign speculators causes the fundamental steady state to 
be stable is given by  .
  1 . 0 , 2 . 0 , 3 . 0 , 4 . 0 , , , , = = = = H A A H H A A H γ γ β β
  29abroad, all three markets are connected. One of our results is that isolated stable stock 
markets may become unstable in the presence of foreign speculators. Instead of 
displaying fixed point dynamics, a stock market may then be characterized by 
endogenous price fluctuations. Hence, a country which opens up its stock markets to 
foreign speculators may experience more volatile dynamics. As a matter of fact, the 
foreign exchange market may also become unstable. Interestingly, this result does not 
hinge upon assuming the existence of additional speculators on the stock markets. A 
mere relocation of the existing mass of speculators may even be sufficient to generate 
instability and endogenous price movements. Moreover, regulating interacting financial 
markets may be a complicated issue since causalities acting inside the market may act 
against conventional wisdom. 
Our simple model may be extended in several directions. First, one may consider 
that speculators switch between trading strategies and/or markets. This would make the 
setup more realistic and we then expect the dynamics to become even more interesting. 
The model by Dieci and Westerhoff (2010) could serve as a starting point. Moreover, an 
attempt could be made to calibrate our framework such that it mimics the behavior of 
actual financial markets more closely, e.g. by adding random exogenous shocks. An 
interesting approach in this direction is that by Corona et al. (2007). Finally, we 
concentrated on a system with two stock markets and one foreign exchange market. It 
would be interesting to allow for more financial markets. Brock et al. (2009) propose an 
interesting framework with spot and derivative markets. However, an attempt could 
even be made to add a macroeconomic model to the setup to study the interplay 
between the real and financial sector. In any case, recurrent financial market turmoil and 
its impact on our economies make it clear that this research area is important and 
deserves greater attention in the future.  
 
  30Appendix 1. Uniqueness of the steady state 
The fundamental steady state F is the unique stationary equilibrium of dynamical 
system (15)-(20). To prove this, we consider a generic steady state P , possibly different 
to F (we use an overbar to denote steady state log prices and demands). At the steady 
state, log prices and the log exchange rate are constant for any t: 
. , , S Z S P U P P U P t t
A A
t
A
t
H H
t
H
t = = = = = =              
From (2), (4), (7) and (9), the demand from any type of chartists at any steady state 
solution is zero: 
0 = = = =
AH
C
AA
C
HA
C
HH
C D D D D   , 
and the price adjustment equations (1), (6), (11) thus imply 
. 0 ) ( ) ( , 0 , 0 = − − = + = +
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F
A HA
F
H AH
F
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F
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F
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F D S P Exp D P Exp D D D D                         (A1) 
The first two conditions in (A1) can be rewritten, respectively, as 
, ) ( ) )( (
S HA H H HA HH F S P F − = − + γ γ γ                ( A 2 )    
. ) ( ) )( ( S F P F
S AH A A AH AA − = − + γ γ γ                ( A 3 )    
It is clear from (A2) and (A3) that  ) (
H H P F − and  ) (
A A P F −  must have opposite signs 
(or both be zero). Obviously, a similar relationship must hold between demands   
) (
H H HH HH
F P F D − =γ  and  ) (
A A AA AA
F P F D − =γ . It furthermore follows from the first 
two conditions of (A1) that  ) ( S F P F D
S H H HA HA
F − + − =γ  and 
) ( S F P F D
S A A AH AH
F + − − =γ  must also have opposite signs (or both be zero). 
However, from the third steady-state condition in (A1), 
HA
F D  and 
AH
F D  cannot have 
opposite signs. As a consequence  0 = =
AH
F
HA
F D D . Substituting this into the first two 
conditions of (A1), it follows that also  . 0 = =
AA
F
HH
F D D  No deviations of prices and 
exchange rate from their fundamental values are thus possible at the steady state.  
  31Appendix 2. Jacobian matrix and parameter reduction 
Components   and   (equations 15 and 17) of the 6-D map driving the dynamical 
system have straightforward partial derivatives, due to linearity. The partial derivatives 
of component   are the following 
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where demand functions  ,  ,  ,  , defined by (4), (5), (9), and (10), 
respectively, vanish at the steady state. Therefore, by setting   and 
, the Jacobian matrix at the fundamental steady state F can be 
written as follows 
HA
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where 0 is a two-dimensional null matrix and where 
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As can be verified, under the following change of parameters 
Hj H Hj β α β = :
~
,   ,  
Aj A Aj β α β = :
~ Hj H Hj γ α γ = : ~ ,  
Aj A Aj γ α γ = : ~ ,  
j
j
S
j Φ = Φ
α
α
: ~     ,  {} A H j , ∈
coefficients  ,   and   no longer appear in the Jacobian matrix (A4), which turns 
out to depend on a smaller number of parameters. By rewriting (with some abuse of 
notation) the new parameters without the tilde, the Jacobian matrix (A4) becomes 
exactly equal to (25), where coefficients  ,   and   have been normalized to one. 
The latter parameter restriction therefore does not imply any loss of generality, at least 
concerning the local stability analysis of the steady state. 
H α
A α
S α
H α
A α
S α
 
  33Appendix 3. Factorization of the characteristic polynomial for symmetric markets 
Here we prove that the 6th degree characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix (A4) 
can be factorized, in the case of symmetric markets, into the product of a 2nd degree 
and a 4th degree polynomial, according to equations (28) and (29). By assuming 
, and by imposing restrictions (26) on the remaining parameters, the 
blocks constituting the Jacobian matrix (A4) become 
1 = = = S A H α α α
⎟ ⎟
⎠
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⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ Φ − − Φ
= =
0 0
) (
:
F F F
H
β γ β ,      B C C Φ − = − = A ,      
⎟ ⎟
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0 1
2 ) ( 2 1
F F F β γ β
D
and the full matrix   is given in equation (27). The eigenvalues of   are the 
(real or complex) solutions to the algebraic equation 
) (F J ) (F J
0 ) ) ( det( : ) ( 6 = − = I F λ λ J P , where 
 denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix and  n I ) (λ P  denotes the characteristic 
polynomial of matrix  . For our purposes, the six-dimensional matrix  ) (F J
6 ) ( : I F M λ − = J  is conveniently partitioned as follows 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
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I F M ~ ~
~ ~
) ( : 6 λ J , 
where  2 :
~
I A A λ − =  is two-dimensional,  ( ) B 0 B = :
~  has dimension (2,4), 
 has dimension (4,2) and   is four-
dimensional. Note first that 
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det( 2 λ P = A , where  ) ( 2 λ P  is the 2nd degree polynomial 
defined by equation (29). Second, note that, based on standard matrix reduction 
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13,   can generally be rewritten as  ) det(M
)
~ ~ ~ ~
det( )
~
det( ) det(
1B A C D A M
− − = .                           (A5) 
We shall therefore prove that  )
~ ~ ~ ~
det(
1B A C D
− −  is in fact a 4th degree polynomial 
in  λ , so that the characteristic polynomial of   can be factorized according to 
equation (28). By block-matrix multiplication, the four-dimensional matrix 
) (F J
B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~ 1 − −  
can be rewritten in terms of the original two-dimensional blocks  , B , D,    A 2 I
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or, in extended form, 
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where  ) (λ Z  is the following rational function 
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By cofactor expansion of the 4th row of matrix  B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~ 1 − − , one can write 
( ) B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~
det
1 − −  as the sum of a 4th degree polynomial and of a rational function,  ) (λ V , 
defined as 
) ( ) ( ) ( λ λ λ S Z V − = , 
                                                                                          
13 Factorization (A5) is based on the following identity:  
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by which matrix M is decomposed into the product of two block triangular matrices (one lower and one 
upper triangular). This is a type of ‘block LU decomposition’ (see, e.g. Stewart 1999 for a review of such 
matrix reduction techniques and their applications). 
  35where  ) (λ S  is a 3rd degree polynomial expressed as 
( ) ( ) [ ]
() ( ) [] ()
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As can easily be verified, polynomial  ) (λ S  is divisible by  ) ( 2 λ P , namely 
[ ]
F F F P S β λ γ β λ λ Φ − − Φ = ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 .               ( A 6 )  
As a consequence, rational function  ) ( ) ( ) ( λ λ λ S Z V − =  can be simplified into a 3rd 
degree polynomial, too, so that  ( ) B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~
det
1 − −  turns out to be a (4th degree) 
polynomial function, which we denote by  ) ( 4 λ P . The eigenvalues of   can 
therefore by determined separately as the two roots of 
) (F J
) ( : )
~
det( 2 λ P = A  and the four roots 
of  ( ) ) ( :
~ ~ ~ ~
det 4
1 λ P = −
− B A C D , respectively.
14  
Although this factorization is still not enough for a full analytical 
characterization of the parameter region of local asymptotic stability of the steady state 
(the region in which all six eigenvalues are smaller that one in modulus), it enables us to 
perform (in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) a rather exhaustive comparison of the stability 
conditions for the system of interacting markets with the stability conditions we obtain 
when stock markets are independent. 
 
                                                                                          
14  Of course, factorization (A5) generally requires that   is nonsingular,  A
~ ( ) 0
~
det ≠ A . If  ) (λ S  were not 
exactly divisible by  ) ( 2 λ P , then the rational function  ( ) B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~
det
1 − −  would have an (infinite) 
discontinuity at the zeros of  ) ( 2 λ P , and factorization (A5) would not hold there. However, due to (A6), in 
our case any discontinuity in  ( ) B A C D
~ ~ ~ ~
det
1 − −  can be removed. 
  36Appendix 4. State-dependent demand coefficients 
This appendix proves that the local stability conditions of the fundamental steady state 
(in the parameter space) are fully preserved under a more flexible specification of 
agents’ demand, namely, under the case where demand reaction coefficients γ s and β s 
are state-dependent (and thus time-varying). This generalization encompasses a range of 
possible alternative formulations, one of which is briefly discussed at the end of this 
appendix.  
For  , replace the (fixed) demand parameters   and   in equations 
(2)-(5) and (7)-(10) with state-dependent quantities   and  , 
respectively, where   represents the state of the dynamical 
system at time t. It follows that any of the demand functions specified in equations (2)-
(5) and (7)-(10) now have the following general structure 
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t
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t
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t t Z S U P U P = x
t t t r D μ = , 
where ) ( t t x μ μ =  represents a generic reaction parameter and   can be 
interpreted as a rules’ trading signal. For instance, in the case of chartists from country 
H trading in country A (equation 4), we would have   and 
. Note also that 
) ( t t r r x =
) ( t
HA HA
t t x β β μ = =
H
t t
H
t t t U Z P S r − − + = 0 ) ( = F r , that is, the trading signal of any trading 
rule is zero at the fundamental steady state. When computing the Jacobian matrix of the 
generalized 6-D map, it is clear that the partial derivatives of the demand functions with 
respect to the generic state variable   have the following structure  k x
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( F F F F F
k k k k x
r
x
r
x
r
x
D
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
μ μ
μ
, 
where  ) ( : F μ μ =  denotes the steady-state value of the reaction coefficient. This proves 
that the Jacobian matrix of the extended model is formally the same as matrix (25), 
  37provided that we interpret the constant reaction coefficients γ ’s and β ’s in that matrix 
as the steady state values of the corresponding time-varying coefficients. 
Here we briefly comment on a possible alternative formulation of the model, 
encompassed by this general framework. Assume that demand functions (2)-(3) and (9)-
(10) represent the optimal amount of wealth (in currency H) to be invested by traders 
from country H in stock markets H and A, respectively. Analogously, assume that (7)-
(8) and (4)-(5) represent the amount of wealth (in currency A) to be invested by traders 
from country A in stock markets H and A, respectively. Note that optimal wealth 
allocations similar to (2)-(5) and (7)-(10) can easily be derived within a mean-variance 
setup with multiple assets, under suitable assumptions about investors’ first- and 
second-moment beliefs.
15 For instance, the quantity defined in equation (4), which we 
now denote by  , would represent the amount of wealth (in currency A) invested in 
stock market H by chartists from country A. The corresponding demand in real units 
would read 
HA
t C, Ω
) (
) exp( ) exp(
1 1
,
,
H
t t
H
t t
HA
t H
t t
HA
t C HA
t C P S P S
P S
D − − − − + =
Ω
= β , 
where   is the state-dependent reaction coefficient, defined as 
HA
t β
) exp( ) exp(
: H
t t
HA
HA
t P S
β
β = , 
which has the steady-state value  )] ( exp[ :
S H HA HA F F + − = β β . The demand functions 
of the other agent types are modified along similar lines. It is clear that this alternative 
formulation results again in the same Jacobian matrix (A4), provided that its 
coefficients are properly redefined as the new steady-state coefficients. Moreover, the 
model would again be represented by a nonlinear dynamical system. 
                                                                                          
15  See, e.g. Dieci and Westerhoff, 2010 (Appendix A) and Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2005). 
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Figure 1: Long-run swings of international asset prices. The top panel shows the 
evolution of the DAX (i.e. the leading German stock market index) between 1996 and 
2010. The bottom panel presents the course of the USD-EUR exchange rate between 
1999 and 2010. 
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Figure 2: Entry of new speculators and comparison of stability regions for isolated and 
interacting markets. The yellow area indicates a minimal parameter region where the 
fundamental steady state is stable for isolated markets but unstable for interacting 
markets. The blue area indicates a parameter region where the fundamental steady state 
is unstable for isolated markets but may be stable for interacting markets.  
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Figure 3: The model dynamics for parameter setting (44). The left-hand and right-hand 
panels show the dynamics in the time domain and in phase space, respectively. A longer 
transient period is omitted. 
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagrams for stock prices in country H. Simulations are based on 
parameter setting (44) but the bifurcation parameters are varied as indicated on the axis.  
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Figure 5: The model dynamics for parameter setting (46). The left-hand and right-hand 
panels show the dynamics in the time domain and in phase space, respectively. A longer 
transient period is omitted. 
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagrams for stock prices in country H. Simulations are based on 
parameter setting (46) but the bifurcation parameters are varied as indicated on the axis.  
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Figure 7: The model dynamics for parameter setting (48). The left-hand and right-hand 
panels show the dynamics in the time domain and in phase space, respectively. A longer 
transient period is omitted. 
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Figure 8: The model dynamics for parameter setting (50). The left-hand and right-hand 
panels show the dynamics in the time domain and in phase space, respectively. A longer 
transient period is omitted. 
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